Abstract. This paper describes several speedups for computation in the order p + 1 subgroup of F * p 2 and the order p 2 − p + 1 subgroup of F * p 6 . These results are in a way complementary to LUC and XTR, where computations in these groups are sped up using trace maps. As a side result, we present an efficient method for XTR with p ≡ 3 mod 4.
Introduction
Many cryptographic protocols rely on the assumed hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in certain groups. Well known examples are prime order subgroups of Z more involved protocols that also require ordinary multiplications of subgroup elements or triple (or larger) exponentiations, they may lead to cumbersome manipulations that outweigh the computational advantages. As a consequence, using trace based representations in more complicated protocols may be inconvenient (unless of course the small representation size is crucial).
For that reason, we consider in this paper how exponentiation speedups in G p+1 and G p 2 −p+1 can be achieved in such a way that other operations are not affected, i.e., while avoiding trace based compression methods. For quadratic extensions we show that for both p ≡ 2 mod 3 and p ≡ 3 mod 4 inversions in G p+1 ⊂ F * p 2 come for free, and that squaring in G p+1 is cheaper than in the field F p 2 . This results in single and double exponentiations that cost about 60% and 75%, respectively, of traditional methods. Both methods are still considerably slower than LUC (see also [22] ).
Our main result concerns sixth degree extensions, i.e., the case G p 2 −p+1 ⊂ F * p 6 . We show that for both p ≡ 2 mod 9 and p ≡ 5 mod 9 inversions in G p 2 −p+1 are very cheap, while squaring in G p 2 −p+1 is substantially faster than in F p 6 . Moreover, the methods from [8, 22] can be used to transform a k-bit single exponentiation into a k/2-bit double exponentiation (i.e., the product of two k/2-bit exponentiations). Using appropriate addition chains this results in a vastly improved single exponentiation routine, that takes approximately 26% of the time cited in [13, Lemma 2.1.2.iii]. The improvement for double exponentiation is less spectacular, requiring an estimated 33% compared to [13, Lemma 2.1.2.iv]. Our methods are slightly slower than the improved version of XTR [22] , but faster than the original XTR [13] .
Our proposed methods do not have the compressed-representation benefits or disadvantages of LUC or XTR. Protocols where our methods compare well to LUC and XTR are especially those based on homomorphic ElGamal encryption [7] such as Brands' protocols [3] and Schoenmakers' verifiable secret sharing scheme [19] . Another example is the Cramer-Shoup protocol [6] .
Another consideration is the cost of subgroup membership checking, since the security of several cryptographic protocols stands or falls with the correctness of the generators and proper subgroup membership of other elements. For LUC the cost of the subgroup membership test is negligible. For XTR it is small but not really negligible. Testing membership of G p+1 and G p 2 −p+1 as proposed in this paper only costs a small constant number of operations in the underlying field and is thus negligible, as in LUC.
The proposed methods can also be used in conjunction with LUC and XTR. Given an element in G p+1 or G p 2 −p+1 the cost of computing the LUC respectively XTR representation is negligible. Going from LUC to G p+1 requires a square root computation in F p , going from XTR to G p 2 −p+1 can be done by computing the roots of a third degree polynomial over F p 2 . In both cases extra information is needed to resolve root ambiguities.
Unless indicated otherwise, all logarithms in this paper are natural.
Preliminaries

Computational Model
Throughout this paper we use the following conventions to measure the costs of operations. Let l be a positive integer that will be clear from the context. We use M for the cost of multiplying two l-bit numbers (without modular reduction), S for the cost of squaring an l-bit number (idem), D for reducing a 2l-bit number modulo an l-bit number, A 1 for adding two l-bit numbers (including a reduction if needed), and A 2 for adding two 2l-bit numbers (no reduction). A modular addition (of cost A 1 ) typically boils down to two or three plain l-bit additions (which makes it hard to determine whether A 1 > A 2 or vice versa). Consequently, the stated numbers of additions should be taken with a grain of salt. As another example, in Lemma 3.24.iv the cost of subgroup squaring is approximated as 2S + 2D + A 1 , assuming that the cost of subtracting one or multiplying by two is negligible compared to A 1 and A 2 . Furthermore, the reduction (of cost D) is sometimes fed numbers slightly larger than 2l-bits. Anyway, for exponentiations we always switch back to the simplified case A 1 = A 2 = 0, M = D = 0.5, and S = 0.3, assuming some fixed value for l. This corresponds to the model where an l-bit modular multiplication is the unit of measurement, a squaring costs 80% of a modular multiplication, and additions are considered negligible. This simplification facilitates comparisons with other results given in the literature.
Discrete Logarithm Problem
In this paper it is assumed that the discrete logarithm problem in the order q subgroup G q of F * p d is sufficiently difficult. Here we briefly review the well known implications of this assumption for the choice of q given p d . It follows from the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [15] that q is best chosen as a prime number. Furthermore, it follows from the Pollard-ρ method [16, 23] that √ q should be sufficiently large, say at least 2 80 or 2 100 depending on the security requirements. Finally, it was shown in [11] 
for p → ∞ and d fixed [9, 17, 18] . Summarizing, we find that the order q must be a prime of at least, say, 160 bits, irrespective of the value of d. For d = 2 we have the additional requirement that q divides Φ 2 (p) = p + 1 and that the bit length of the prime p is at least, say, 512. For d = 6 the order q divides Φ 6 (p) = p 2 − p + 1 and p must be a prime of bit length at least, say, 170.
Finite Field Representation
In cryptography, d-th degree extensions of finite fields are most commonly represented using either polynomial or normal bases (see [14] for definitions and details). With a proper choice of minimal polynomial (such as a trinomial with small coefficients), polynomial bases allow relatively efficient multiplication and squaring in the sense that the usual reduction stage from a degree 2d−2 product to the degree d − 1 result can be performed at the cost of cd additions in the underlying prime field, for a very small constant c. In general, this is not the case for normal bases, but they have the advantage that the Frobenius automorphism can be computed for free. For polynomial bases the Frobenius automorphism can be computed at a small but non-negligible cost. A class of polynomial bases combining the best of both worlds is featured in [5] . They are based on cyclotomic fields. The following theorem, a slight adaptation of [14 
This theorem implies d|φ(n).
We fix e = 1. Furthermore, we concentrate on d = φ(n), i.e., the case that p mod n generates Z * n . This requires Z * n to be cyclic, so that n is either 2, 4, the power of an odd prime, or twice the power of an odd prime. We ignore n = 2, since it does not lead to a proper extension.
Actually, [5] is concerned with rings Z[γ]/pZ[γ] where n is a prime power, γ is a primitive n-th root of unity, and p is an integer of which primality is to be determined. If p is indeed a prime generating Z *
We abuse notation by identifying a andā. We are interested in finding fast single and double exponentiations for G q , where q|Φ d (p) (cf. Section 2.2). For that purpose we formulate fast multiplication and squaring methods for
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A major ingredient when calculating modulo Γ is writing powers > d of γ as linear combinations in Γ . This reduction is performed in two stages. First, all powers higher than n are reduced using γ n = 1; next the relation Φ n (γ) = 0 is used to map everything to powers of γ between 1 and φ(n). Since d = φ(n), we are done. Note that only additions and subtractions are needed for the reduction.
In [11] only pairs (p, n) are considered for which n is prime and for which p generates Z * n , because they lead to so-called optimal normal bases. The relevance of such bases for characteristics > 2 is limited, and the 'cheap' reduction they achieve (just 2d − 1 additions in F p ) is almost met by the somewhat wider class considered above.
Key Generation
Given n and d = φ(n) and a desired level of security, key generation consists of two phases: sufficiently large primes p and q have to be found with p generating Z * n and q dividing Φ d (p), after which a generator of G q has to be found.
Finding p and q.
For small d, as in this paper, standard security requirements lead to log p > log q, cf. Section 2.2. In this case the obvious generalization of the method from [13] can be used. First, an appropriately sized prime q is selected, where q|Φ d (p) may impose a priori restrictions on q (e.g., q ≡ 1 mod 3
is found and p is determined as r + q for ∈ Z ≥0 such that p is a large enough prime that generates Z * n . With larger d (or e > 1, cf. Theorem 2.31) one may aim for primes p that fit in a computer word (i.e., log 2 (p) = 32 or 64). Although this may be advantageous, log p becomes substantially smaller than log q. We are not aware of an efficient method to find such p and q. If q is selected first, the probability is negligible that an appropriate p exists such that q|Φ de (p). If p is selected first, there is only a very slim probability that Φ de (p) has an appropriate prime factor, and finding it leads to an unattractive integer factorization problem. In this paper the possibility log p < log q is not further discussed.
Finding a generator of G q . This problem is easily solved by selecting
another h has to be generated. The specifics follow.
Let f ∈ F p and let γ be a primitive n-th root of unity as in Section 2.3.
where r + and r − are both polynomials with positive coefficients. The equation (γ+f )
gives rise to a system of d equations in the coefficients of h f . Since the system only depends on p's congruency class modulo n (and not on p itself), solving the system can be done before actually picking p. The resulting h f corresponding to several different choices for f can be hardcoded in the program. In Section 4.4 the details for G p 2 −p+1 with p ≡ 2 mod 9 are presented.
LUC and XTR
For completeness, we give a very brief description of LUC and XTR. LUC [20] is based on the subgroup G p+1 ⊆ F * p 2 and the trace map Tr :
− Tr(g)X + 1, the roots of the polynomial X 2 − Tr(g)X + 1 are g and its conjugate g p . Define V n = Tr(g n ), then it can easily be verified
. Thus, computation of V n+m from V n , V m , and V n−m costs a multiplication (a squaring if n = m) in F p . The V n coincide with a special instance of the Lucas-function.
XTR [13] is based on the subgroup G p 2 −p+1 ⊆ F * p 6 and the trace map Tr : 
Both LUC and XTR compute Tr(g n ) instead of g n and in case of a double exponentiation this would be Tr(g n h m ) instead of g n h m . The necessity of knowing V n−m respectively c n−m and c n−2m makes ordinary exponentiation routines unapplicable. Nevertheless, in either case efficient exponentiation methods exist. However, the shortest addition chain is typically considerably longer than the shortest one. For further details, see [22] and the references contained therein.
Quadratic Extensions
In this section we discuss computing in F p 2 and G p+1 ⊂ F * p 2 . Fast computations in the full field F p 2 with p ≡ 2 mod 3 are important for XTR and have been discussed in [13] . We show that the field arithmetic for p ≡ 3 mod 4 from [5, Case p k = 4] can be used for XTR without significant loss of efficiency compared to p ≡ 2 mod 3. The subgroup G p+1 is not relevant for XTR, but it is the subgroup on which LUC is based. We show that it yields some extra computational benefits that are, however, still not competitive with LUC.
We first discuss the field arithmetic for p ≡ 2 mod 3 in general and then focus on the subgroup. The case p ≡ 3 mod 4 is dealt with similarly, first the field arithmetic and then the subgroup arithmetic. Suitable exponentiation routines that apply to either case conclude this section. 
2 ) is an optimal normal basis of F p 2 over F p . Using Γ instead of (1, γ) leads to slightly fewer additions than the basis (1, γ) discussed in [5 a, b, c ∈ F p 2 with p ≡ 3 mod 4 
Lemma 3.22 Let
Subgroup Exponentiation
For a single exponentiation we have to compute a m , where m has roughly the same bitlength k as q. With signed flexible windows [4] of size 5, this requires about k + 1 squarings and 7 + k/6 multiplications in G q . With Lemmas 3.14.iv and 3.24.iv the squaring cost is ≈ (3S + 2D)(k + 1) and with Lemmas 3.12.iii and 3.22.iii the multiplication cost is ≈ (3M + 2D) (7 + k/6) . Under the assumption that M ≈ D and S ≈ 0.3M the resulting number of F p -multiplications is 19.1 for the precomputation plus 2.0 per exponent bit.
For double exponentiation we have to compute a m b n for m and n of roughly equal size and with m as above. This can be computed using Solinas' trick [21, See also Appendix A], resulting in k squarings and k/2 multiplications in G q . With G q -arithmetic as above, this becomes (2S +2D)k + (3M +2D)k/2 ≈ 2.85k multiplications in F p . The precomputation of ab and ab −1 uses Lemmas 3.14.v and 3.24.v. Combination of these observations leads to the following theorem. These results improve previously reported ones, but the resulting exponentiations are less efficient than the LUC exponentiations. So, even though we have several related results concerning improved key selection and other choices of p, we leave the subject of quadratic extensions and move on to sixth degree extensions because there our methods appear to have a more substantial impact.
Sixth Degree Extension
In this section fast exponentiation routines for the group G p 2 −p+1 ⊂ F * p 6 with p ≡ 2 mod 9 are described. Let f be a sixth degree irreducible polynomial over some ground field, with root γ. Consider the extension induced by γ and represented by a polynomial basis consisting of six consecutive powers of γ, such as (1, γ, . . . , γ 5 ) or (γ, γ 2 , . . . , γ 6 ). The cost of computation in this representation depends on the general question of how many ground field multiplications are needed to multiply two degree five polynomials, and on the specific question of what f looks like. Therefore, a short word on the multiplication of fifth degree polynomials in general, before going into details about the field representation and the benefits the group offers. These results are then used in the subsequent exponentiation routines. We conclude this section with an improved key selection method.
Multiplication of Fifth Degree Polynomials
Multiplication of two polynomials of degree five can be done in 18 multiplications plus a handful of additions [2, 5] . Indeed, let G(x) = 
Each of the C i can be computed using 6 multiplications in the ground field. For example, because
, and c 5 = (g 1 − g 2 )(h 1 − h 2 ), we have that
With similar expressions for C 1 and C 2 it follows that 18 ground field multiplications (or squarings) suffice to compute the product GH (or the square G 2 ).
If the g i and h i are l-bit numbers, and one is interested in an (unreduced) product with 2l-bit or sligthly larger coefficients, then computing C 0 costs 6M + 6A 1 + 7A 2 and the cost of computing GH as in (1) is 18M + 24A 1 + 21A 2 .
It remains to reduce GH modulo f , at a cost depending on f . This is discussed in the remainder of this section for several ground fields F p . In that case the resulting coefficients must be reduced modulo p at a cost of 6D for l-bit p. 
Field Representation for
. Thus, p-th powering costs A 1 . In a similar way it follows that p 3 -th powering costs 2A 1 . For multiplication in F p 6 the method from Section 4.1 is used, with proper adjustment of the powers of x, e.g.,
It follows with straightforward bookkeeping that collecting corresponding powers of x in Relation (1) combined with the modular reductions costs 12A 2 + 6D. (For the basis  (1, γ, . . . , γ 5 ) we find that the collecting phase costs 14A 2 , which slightly improves the 18A 2 reported in [5] .) With Section 4.1 it follows that multiplication can be done for 18M + 6D + 24A 1 + 33A 2 . Doing more elaborate collecting reduces the 33A 2 to 29A 2 . Squaring follows by replacing 18M by 18S, but it can be done substantially faster by observing that a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 ) = (a 4 , a 0 − a 3 , a 5 , a 1 , −a 3 , a 2 ). The solution a 0 = a 1 = a 3 = a 4 = 0 and a 2 = a 5 is not surprising since 1 + γ 3 + γ 6 = 0, so an element c ∈ F p takes the form −cγ 3 − cγ 6 . Similarly, Computing a
If a ∈ G p 2 −p+1 , then v i = 0 for 0 ≤ i < 6 and the resulting six relations can be used to significantly reduce the cost of squaring in 5 ) be the vector consisting of the v i 's. Then for any 6 × 6-matrix M , we have that
, because in that case V is the all-zero vector. Carrying out this computation symbolically, involving the expressions for the v i 's for a particular choice of M yields the following: 
Given that we are working over a sixth degree extension, the six multiplications and reductions required for (3) Remark 4.41 Our methods work, and result in identical runtimes, as long as p mod 9 generates Z * 9 . Since φ(φ(9)) = 2, the only other case is p ≡ 5 mod 9. Several other choices of p can be handled in a similar fashion.
Timings
All methods were implemented to verify their correctness and runtime characteristics. The table below summarizes runtimes for G q ⊂ G p 2 −p+1 ⊂ F * p 6 for 170-bit p and q, and compares them to the XTR timings from [13, 22] . They are in milliseconds on a 600 MHz Pentium III NT laptop, averaged over 100 random p, q pairs and 100 exponentiations per pair. The timings confirm that our new methods for F p 6 -subgroup exponentiation are superior to the original XTR and almost competitive with the faster version of XTR from [22] . This shows that the main reason to use XTR would no longer be its speed, but mostly its compact -and sometimes inconvenient -representation. 
